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Abstract
This work is about making decisions by digital means. Funds should be distributed by the
students of Heinrich-Heine-University. The proposals were made by the students themselves
without further influence. For this purpose, dialog-based argumentation is used to give the
participants a better understanding of various arguments. In addition, a software service has
been developed which allows the students to express their preferences for various proposals.
An experiment was carried out at the university, which should prove whether students are
satisfied with this type of participation.
The results indicate that the procedure is well accepted and thus successful. However, im-
provements to the process itself were necessary during the experiment and should be consid-
ered for future procedures. Further procedures are desired.
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
With the rise of the internet, people are able to communicate with each other in near real-time.
This enables us to connect people to enhance their life in a meaningful way. Communication
is key to this kind of society.
This work will explore the possibility to make decisions for budget allocations with the
support of dialog-based argumentation. It extends the Dialog-Based Argumentation Sys-
tem (D-BAS) with a way to assign costs to proposals and provides a separate system for
information and voting on said proposals.
1.1. Participatory Budgeting
Participatory budgeting is a decision process in which common citizens are involved to allo-
cate funds. The ruling over these funds was mainly in the hand of the acting government and
was done behind closed doors, often with none or just a little information for the public to
comprehend.
With the desire, and in some cases even need, for transparency a government is concerned to
involve its citizens into the process. The first step is providing information about the internal
processes of the administration. Several open data initiatives, with the goal to make this kind
of information accessible to the public, began to grow and are even getting implemented as
law [ope17].
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The next step is to involve citizens actively, by allowing some kind of influence in the process.
This can reach from surveys, which are used as advice by councils to make better decisions
for the public, and can go so far as to leave the entire decision to the citizens, with former
decision-makers just taking a steering role in the process.
1.2. Goals of this Work
The goal of this work is to research whether it is possible with a rather small group of students
from the computer science department, to have a deliberative process of rational proposal
making, educational argumentation, and a direct voting procedure.
This work provides the means to enable the participants to take part in the participatory
budgeting process by expressing their most important positions in the discussion. It has been
made possible for the participants to prioritise their arguments in the service called decide
against each other after they had been discussing them between themselves in D-BAS. The
priorities are then used to rank proposals against each other to form a fitting result set, which
stays inside the budget and is simple enough to be understood without extensive knowledge
in computational social choice.
It should be observed whether the ranking by a specific method generates the best sense of
fairness for the participating users. An understandable and accepted result is desired. For a
better acceptance of the result, a brief explanation of how the decision is made was given.
An experiment should be conducted to test if there is interest in this form of participation.
The experiment is not artificial, but is a real process, with real money, which is scientifically
accompanied. It, therefore, is as close to reality as it gets with the hope to introduce this
kind of participation to more areas, like other departments. It should be used to improve the
procedure iteratively.
2
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1.3. Structure
The work will begin with an introduction to established and proposed ways to argue online.
This will show the advantages of argumentation systems over other means of participation.
Thereafter, a short introduction to voting and scoring systems will be given. It will just
scratch on the surface of computational social choice but gives enough detail to understand
the used scoring system and an outlook what would (computational) be possible.
Then the modifications to D-BAS and the features for decide are presented. It is explained
why certain decisions were made to satisfy the needs of the experiment. Also, it contains an
example that was given to the participants for them to understand the voting procedure.
Afterwards, the execution and the results of the experiment will be discussed. This includes
a part of the survey, which was done in cooperation with the sociologists of the Heinrich-
Heine-University. In addition, it contains suggestions for improvements to the systems used,
D-BAS and decide, which should be considered for future procedures.
To compare this work to other methods, three different participation procedures will be pre-
sented. These range from completely analogue to digital methods not unlike the procedure
used here. For two of them, the differences are listed in detail, as they are similar enough to
this work, that ideas could be adapted.
Finally, a summary of the lessons learned will be given, along with general considerations of
where the topic might go in the future, and what should be explored to compare this work.
3
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Argumentation Systems
This chapter gives an introduction to argumentation systems and highlights their advantages
versus traditional ways of expressing opinions online, like forums or comment sections. It
assumes, that more advanced systems allow for a more defined way of information storage,
which can be used to confront the participant with different aspects of a topic in a more
efficient way.
2.1. Motivation
For participants to engage in a decision-making process, there has to be some kind of under-
standing of the problem. While each participant could inform herself about a disputed topic
to form her opinion, this method of opinion-formation will result in narrowed down view on
the problem at hand. Getting knowledge about the reasoning of other participants can prove
complicated, as we live in a world where (nearly) everyone can communicate in real-time.
Everyone can submit their own statements and receive the opinions and arguments of each
other via means of the internet, but they are often unstructured, like in forums.
4
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Figure 2.1.: Exploding complexity with a
growing number of users, as each
user has to argue with n−1 other
users.
Figure 2.2.: References inside a forum
thread. This leads to a con-
fusing and not comprehensible
argumentation, because they
are perceived in the order of
creation.
2.2. Forums
Forums are one of the oldest forms of online participation [LF12], where users can argue
about a topic. The problem with argumentation in a traditional forum is, that the argumenta-
tion gets harder or even impossible with a growing number of participants.
Imagine an argumentation between two participants, that goes back and forth. If a third par-
ticipant enters the argumentation, this can get quite irritating, as the new user would probably
have another mindset then the other participants, influencing the argumentation in a way, that
disturbs the original argumentation structure. To maintain the overview over where the thread
is going with its topic the participants have to make sure that they read each message from
each other participant like shown in Figure 2.1.
You can often see posts in forums, that refer to a post several posts before their own, ad-
dressing the author of this post directly by name to indicate their interest of continuing the
argumentation at this point like shown in Figure 2.2. This creates a sub-thread in a forum
thread, that is not supported by the linear data structure of the forum.
Another disadvantage is that this form of participation, through the expression, of thoughts
results in large, complex texts and are more comparable to a letter exchange as they are to a
5
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real-time argumentation. Made statements are not just confined to a single thought, as users
often submit them in a length of several sentences to full articles.
2.3. Comment Sections
Nowadays, in times when every kind of information is available at all times, forums made
way for a more rapid type of expression, in form of smaller snippets, which are done through
comments known from pages like Facebook, Reddit or even Twitter. These systems allow for
a restricted way of branching out from different statements a participant has done. All three
examples allow for nested comments, where a participant can react to a previous statement
later on, without disrupting the current argumentation, in a branch. Although the comments
can be nested, there is often a limit on how deep an argumentation can go, e.g. Facebook
allows only for two layers, making a compromise between functionality and clarity.
The greatest drawback of these systems is that they are missing any information about the
attitude of the participants. Participants are not encouraged to add separate information, on
how their argument is to understand. Entries in this systems lack semantic information, as
a user can not enter the attitude of the entry, like if the entry is a counter-argument against
the entry before. Or if the entry is a new piece of argumentation, not tied to a preceding
argument.
2.4. Argumentation Systems
Argumentation systems are trying to fix the aforementioned problems by guiding the par-
ticipant to establish a context in an already existing argumentation for her own arguments.
They allow modelling of relations between (at best) atomic statements, so understanding the
context, in which a statement has been made, becomes simple as a this-because-of-that ar-
gument. The statements and arguments are therefore representing a graph which can grow
indefinite in depth and width.
The edges in this graph can contain information, which is missing in comment sections. A
participant can add his statement with the information, that it is an argument against another
6
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statement from another participant. This results in a system where statements from users are
much more tied to their intended meaning, giving them more semantic meaning which can
be understood and used by machines.
Although there are ways to structure the content that is contributed, the amount of content
which is gained from hundreds or even thousands of participants can be overwhelming at
times. Each participant would have to asses present arguments and sort their statements
correctly into the right position, adding the necessary data to build the graph, which can be
quite inconvenient, especially for inexperienced users. If these relations in the graph are
not utilized, it will result in the practical loss of data, as a seemingly new argument will
be added, while the same argument may have been made before results in a partition of
arguments. This reduces the diversity of arguments and introduces redundancy. Merging this
grown apart parts of the argumentation later on will be quite laborious. This is not a problem
introduced by argumentation systems, this is present in the earlier systems as well, although
an argumentation graph can be utilized to deal with this.
2.5. D-BAS — The Dialog-Based Argumentation System
D-BAS1 [KBBM16] [KMB+18] is an argumentation system which makes use of the argu-
mentation graph to allow participants to take part in an argumentation, naturally by letting
them interact via a dialog like interface. This allows for a scoped interaction, where the
participants are given just a partial view on the argumentation, reducing the perceived com-
plexity of the argumentation graph. Having the system itself as one’s argumentation partner
enables horizontal scaling of the argumentation. Users do not interact directly between each
other, this can be seen in Figure 2.3
2.5.1. The Argumentation Graph
The argumentation graph of D-BAS is the structure in which arguments are stored. The graph
is acyclic and directed, though the acyclic property is not enforced by the data structure and
could be utilised, later on. These directional circles are not possible to create with the means
1https://dbas.cs.uni-duesseldorf.de
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…
Figure 2.3.: Horizontal scaling of argumentation with via an automated intermediary. Each
user just has to argue with the system.
of the user interface and are therefore not considered in the rules of the dialog game execution
platform.
The dialog game execution platform is the logic behind D-BAS, that chooses on how to
proceed in an argumentation by consulting the given argumentation graph and the user’s
current location in it.
Issue At the root of every argumentation graph there is an issue node, containing all infor-
mation about the current topic, like the title, a summary, flags whether this discussion
should be writeable etc. An issue is the scope of the discussion a participant wants to
take part in and it gives context to all statements in the discussion.
A decision process, like it will be presented in this work, would be represented by a
single issue.
Position Positions are the nodes that are connected to an issue node. They are sub-topics or
proposals on the topic that a user can make. The users then have the option to agree or
disagree on a position starting their path through the attached graph. Positions cannot
be reused in the argumentation as they are often neutral in their meaning, not suited
to support or attack another argument. This is by design and not by the necessity
of the argumentation graph. For example, systems like EDEN [MSM18], which are
developed to interconnect D-BAS argument graphs, have no special role for positions.
Positions are a special case of Statements.
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Statement Statements are the reusable part of the graph. They are intended to be atomic,
meaning they just contain their meaning themselves. Every context in which they
would be understood differently is provided by their usage inside the graph. For State-
ments to be able to exist in the graph they need to be established in a context in the
form of a premise.
Statements are not confined to a single issue, as one goal of D-BAS is to reduce re-
dundancies. This allows the user to reuse already made arguments, connecting the
sub-graph of another issue to the current one.
Argument The graph has to be connected, of course, this is the job of arguments. Arguments
are directed edges. Their root is one or more premises and they connect them to another
statement or when making an undercut, even another argument. More on undercuts in
the next section.
The endpoints of the edge are called conclusion. The arguments contain the informa-
tion whether a premise is used to attack or to support the conclusion, this is called the
attitude of the argument. Arguments are either an attack or a support.
2.5.2. Relations in the Graph
To use the graph a hand full of higher relations between nodes are defined, with which the
participant will traverse through the graph. They relate to proper human argumentation tech-
niques and are made directly available through user interface options.
Support Altogether a support is every argument with a positive attitude like every negative
argument is called an attack, but since there is just one relation with this property this
term is used twice.
An argument A supports an argument B when the argument A has a positive attitude
towards the premise of the argument B. A support can be rebutted on the conclusion of
argument A, through an undermine of B.
Rebut An argument rebuts another argument when the arguments are of opposing attitudes
and share the same conclusion. Example: ‘A is a good reason for C, but there is
9
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proposal B, which is a reason against C.’
Undermine An undermine is an attack on the premise of another argument and therefore
the opposite of a support. An attacking argument has a negative attitude towards the
premise of the attacked argument.
Undercut An argument is an undercut when its attitude is negative towards another argu-
ment. This occurs, when the participant has the opinion, that the premise of the at-
tacked argument is a correct statement, but the usage of it in the argument is invalid.
The premise and the conclusion do not relate together.
These relations are not complete, as they do not mention for example an argument, which has
a positive attitude towards another argument. This was omitted as they are too complicated
to comprehend, and were rarely used anyway. Experiments have shown, that the majority of
arguments, which do not represent positions, are attacks [KMM17]. This is probably a result
of D-BAS trying to provide the user with a counter-argument, which therefore always forces
the user into a defensive role.
I P
B
A
D
C
Figure 2.4.: Example of an argumentation graph. I denotes an issue, P a position, A-D are
arguments. The targets of the edges are called conclusion, the sources premise.
A supports P.
B rebuts A on P, by attacking the conclusion of the supported P.
C undermines A, by attacking its premise.
D undercuts C, by directly attacking C.
10
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2.5.3. Moderation of the Argumentation
D-BAS has a distributed moderation system, where the users are empowered to vote for or
against changes of the argumentation graph. Statements that should be reworked can be
reported by the users and are shown in queues, where it can be voted on these changes.
Changes are approved, when the first side —pro or against— reaches five votes, or one side
has three votes more than the other side.
Possible changes include the deletion of inappropriate statements, correction of spelling er-
rors or the mere proposal, that a statement should be edited, but without a new proposal.
Furthermore, there are more advanced moderation features, such as splitting an argument in
two or merging two same arguments to one.
11
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Voting and Scoring Systems
This chapter shows up some methods a vote can take place and how these votes can be scored
to deliver a result that fits. It will be confined to what is necessary for applying them and their
basic advantages and disadvantages, not going in too deep into the field of computational so-
cial choice. Priority is that the procedures stay understandable to an untrained participant.
3.1. Motivation
To make a decision there has to be a foundation on how to decide. It needs rules on how a
certain decision will be made or not. Of importance is the difference between how a decision
is made by an individual and a decision that will be made by a group.
A human being by itself compares a set of choices and weights them against each other by
certain criteria, such as personal implications, experiences and own goals. These criteria
may work for the decision of a single person but are getting complex when there is a group
of people. Even for two people, the challenge is to align their needs and desires, even though
they can communicate efficiently. In a larger group of people the possibility to communicate,
and as a result negotiate, is vastly reduced. Thus making it impossible for anyone to decide
in a way that fits best for all.
We have votes to tackle this problem. Voting is nothing other than the aggregation of several
personal decisions, namely who or what is best for themselves and their relatable environ-
12
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ments, like your family and friends. Several ways on how to vote on something and how to
aggregate these votes for a final decision exist. Different forms of voting and scoring have
different results and because of this, they are suitable for different problems. Voting proce-
dures depend on what is voted on. Be it the vote for the single next leader of a group or, like
in the case of this work, the best way to distribute money to different proposals in a way most
voters will be satisfied with the what is going to be implemented.
Fact is that most voting processes are kept simple, to allow the voters to comprehend how
the decision is made. This provides confidence in the process and leads to more acceptance
for the result. If the process seems fair to everyone, then everyone should agree with the
outcome, even if the outcome is not in their favour.
3.2. Approval Voting
This form of voting is one of the simplest voting systems. The voter is given a binary choice
to either approve or reject a candidate — giving a score of 1 or 0. All candidates scores are
then added together. The winner of the procedure is the candidate with the highest sum of
scores.
An advantage of this scoring system is that voters are able to vote for whomever candidate
they wish. They can, if they like, vote for every candidate they approve to win. Because of
this, a voter can cast a vote without the fear of throwing this vote away for a candidate they
like but has low chances of winning. By doing this, they can actually unwillingly support
an unwanted candidate, as they deny their vote to an actual rival of this unwanted candidate.
Such a voting behaviour would split the votes between two or more candidates, resulting in
a smaller proportion of all the votes for each candidate.
Imagine a scenario with four candidates A, B, C and D. The majority of two-thirds of the
voters would like to see A, B or C to win, and would be satisfied enough if anyone else wins
except D. They, therefore, spread their single vote over A, B and C, giving each of them
2/9th of the total votes. The third of voters who want D to win vote just for D, giving it
1/3rds (3/9th) of the vote. D wins the vote even though the majority of 6/9 does not vote for
this.
13
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Vote
Candiate A
Candiate B
Candiate C
Candiate D
Vote
Candiate A
Candiate B
Candiate C
Candiate D
Figure 3.1.: The ballots for the voting methods. Left: Approval Voting, Right: Borda Count
Furthermore, the voting procedure is relatively simple, so that no deep knowledge is required
from the voters and the procedure takes place with regular ballots. Like stated in the section
before, it is preferable to use a voting procedure that is easy to understand, as this enables the
voter to have trust in the result.
A drawback of this kind of scoring is that it encourages bullet voting. This is a form of
strategic voting, where a voter votes just for her single most favourite candidate with the
intention of not providing any points to the alternatives. This is possible, because voting for
a candidate which is acceptable, but not the most preferred, creates competition for that most
preferred candidate.
A noteworthy property of this voting system, in the light of this work, is that the system
allows adding a candidate later without the need that the voters have to cast their votes anew.
The new candidate does not change the result if no one votes for it.
3.3. Borda Count
Borda count is a scoring count that asks the voters to rank the choices from most favourite to
least favourite, which is, therefore, a preferential voting system. It requires that the amount
of choices is not changing and the voter casts her vote for every choice.
A total of n choices are scored, so that for each voter, her choices c1,c2, . . . ,cn−1,cn are
denoted the scores n,n−1, . . . ,2,1, which are subsequently summed up for a final score. No
tiebreaker is included in the traditional voting.
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An alternative is that instead of starting with n as the highest and ending with 1 as the lowest
score, n−1,n−2, . . . ,0 is used as the scores [Bla87]. This results in a different distribution
of relative scores, for example in a vote with two choices the first vote will get all the points,
while the second one gets none. In the traditional Borda count, the first vote would get 66%
of the score (2), while the second one is still getting 33% (1).
Another system is the so-called Dowdall system used in the voting process of Nauru [Rei02,
FG14], where the scores are not affected by the total amount of choices, but their position
alone. The scores are distributed by the harmonic progression, so they result in {c1→ 1,c2→
1
2 ,c3 → 13 , . . . ,cn → 1n}. This, of course, strengthens the vote for the first preference and
lessens the one for the later preferences.
Partial Borda Count
As it is often not feasible to let a voter rank all possible choices, modifications to the tra-
ditional Borda count have been evolved. Most of the practical appearances of some sort
of partial Borda counting choose to set a rule on how many votes a voter has to cast. For
example, Papua New Guinea requires the voter to cast at least three votes [Eme13].
All of these scoring systems with partial votes have to deal with the problem on how to score
the choices that were not chosen by a voter. The simplest solution is to assign the minimal
value to them (e.g. 0 or 1). Also, there are proposals to use the average score the remaining
choices would have got if they were chosen [Dum97].
Borda count with multiple winners
All presented methods till now consider just a single possible choice as the winner. Since
in a scenario where an unknown number of proposals fit in a given budget, it is necessary to
conduct a vote with more than one winner, or even an unknown number of winners. Though
in most cases the number of winners is known beforehand, for example in the vote for seats in
a parliament. One way to manage this problem is to just declare the choices with the highest
Borda scores the winners. Other solutions like Quota Borda Count [Dum84] exist, but they
are not used.
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3.4. Score Voting
With the so-called score voting the participant is required to not just approve a candidate, but
to score them on a given scale. This could be a numerical point value, like a scale from one
to ten, or a semantic value. An example for that may be Approve, Disprove and No Opinion,
where the options can be related to a value of+1,−1 and 0 respectively. A scoring vote with
two options is equal to the approval voting.
This can be helpful as it allows for more precise control over one’s voice. Candidates who are
more useful would get a better ranking than less useful, but still desired, candidates. Image
the case that a participant has to rank two candidates. There would be no way to express that
the participant prefers both candidates the same. The other way round it would be impossible
to have a candidate way more insignificant to the final decision.
3.4.1. Direct Resource Allocation
For a resource distribution decision like present in this work, one could assume that it would
be wise to use score voting, with the modification that one can not score a candidate on an
independent scale, but has to distribute a fixed number of points over the candidates. Euro
could be the resource used in the procedure.
This may sound like a good idea in the first place, because it could give a feeling of direct
control over the funds to the participant, as they can directly allocate the funds, without any
intermediate steps given. This is a bad idea since it would not guarantee that any candidate
would get the needed funding to even be viable for implementation.
3.4.2. Decisions over Proposals Based on Their Utility
Scoring with a numerical value could be used to gather the utility from a participant, meaning
how high the perceived importance of a proposal is for a participant. This indicates the impact
on satisfaction with the result. With this information, it would be possible to use algorithms,
that aim to optimize the average satisfaction of the participants.
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It was decided to not use this kind of scoring, as a goal was to keep the process as simple as
possible, in the hope to keep transparency and trust high in the procedure. Using a complex
method with several input weights would result in a procedure which would not be easy to
understand by an untrained participant.
Maximize average satisfaction
This will result in a great outcome on paper. A higher grade of satisfaction of the
voters has the appearance of a great voting result. But it opens to the possibility that an
algorithm declares a minority the winner, just because their satisfaction would balance
out the dissatisfaction of the majority.
Maximize median satisfaction
Maximizing the median of satisfaction could neglect minorities. The majority could
experience great satisfaction with the result, outweighing the dissatisfaction of the
losers.
Minimize dissatisfaction
This optimization goal removes the problem of a high loss for the losers, which would
allow for low satisfaction altogether. No one would be overly dissatisfied, but on the
other hand, eventually no one will gain much. Everyone could be a loser with this as a
strict goal.
Make the algorithm as transparent as possible
The goal chosen in this work is to make the deciding algorithm as transparent as pos-
sible. This is based on the thought that satisfaction may not just be dependent on the
result itself, but the process which leads to it.
3.5. Making a Decision with Multiple Winners
In a procedure where there is more than one winner, the set of winners has to be selected in a
way suited to the kind of decision which is made. Obviously, in a budget decision scenario,
there is often the case that a lot of the top scoring candidates actually cannot win because
of budget constraints. In this case, it has to be decided on what to aim for in the decision.
Should a single, costly proposal that uses up the whole budget be able to win on its own?
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Or should instead the next, possibly cheaper proposals win, as this would allow for less of a
monopolization of the budget?
In the experiment done for this work, it was opted to go the route of the simplest decision
algorithm, as it was aimed for transparency. For example, it could not be allowed that the
proposal with the highest score is not in the winning set. While this would be possible with
some algorithms, it would seem odd for the participants.
3.6. Fairness
Consider the following scenario: There are three proposals A, B and C. All three proposals
have the same cost, but the budget is just enough for a maximum of two. A vote with a
hundred participants is held for these proposals and fifty voters voted for A and B and fifty
voted for C. Everyone, who voted for B also voted for A, and no one who has voted for C has
voted for A or B. The proposals are scored, which results in A getting the highest score, B a
bit less than A and C a bit less than B. Which possible set should be selected as the winning
set?
An algorithm can dictate that A and B have to win, as they have the highest score. C would
not be included in the winning set, because it can not fit into the budget. The decision is
easy to understand for every participant. Should it be expected that everyone will be satisfied
with this decision because of this? Imagine a voter who voted for C. This voter did not gain
anything from the budget, while she sees another voter for A and B who wins it all.
One could argue that the winning set of {A,C} would be fairer, as now everyone wins at
least something. Sure, voters of {A,B} would have a worse result, but at least half of their
favourites win. Both voting groups would have their most favourite candidate included in
the winning set. This could lead to satisfaction with the result for everyone, even if the idea
that some candidate could lose with a higher score sounds counterintuitive. By making the
decision this way, it would profit from a utility factor as mentioned in Section 3.4.2, as it
would be possible to assess whether losing a winner is acceptable for the voters of {A,B},
and it could, therefore, be weighted of if a compromise can be done without appearing unfair.
It could improve the situation for everyone.
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Decision Making with D-BAS
This chapter shows how the decision process was designed. The goal was to make use of
the educational advantages of D-BAS for budgeting decisions. Design decisions were made
with the fact in mind, that the possible participants in this procedure would not have any
experience with argumentation systems and participatory budgeting methods.
4.1. Motivation
Reaching a large group of people and allowing them to each participant in a decision with
equal opportunities is a challenging task which clearly prefers the use of online tools. As the
goals of D-BAS are to provide an educational argumentation that scales and stays objectively,
even if the arguments are getting specific, this system appears like a great choice for an
improved self-consultation process.
Since these procedures vary from situation to situation, it must be possible to adapt the pro-
cedure accordingly. While in early stages of the design, the aim was to utilize the D-BAS
argumentation graph, but not necessarily the D-BAS interface itself, it turned out to be better
to use the already proved interface as well to avoid a scope creep which could threaten a live
usage. A modification of the argumentation flow itself could nevertheless lead to interesting
ways of interacting with the participant and may even allow for advanced decision-making
techniques like negotiation.
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4.2. Adding of New Proposals
In the terms of D-BAS a proposal would be a position. Positions can be argued about and
the first step after selecting a position is to agree or disagree on them, which is perfect for a
scenario like decision-making.
For positions to accommodate for the costs, they had to be modified. The modification added
a plain cost field that every participant had to fill in when they want to add a proposal. The
unit of cost can be arbitrary, the obvious would be money, but it would also be possible to
have a seat in a council as a resource.
Costs can be limited by a minimum amount, the default for this would be 0, as nothing speaks
against a proposal that is free. A higher minimum amount could be useful to eliminate
minuscule proposals, where the administrative costs are higher than their implementation
cost. Proposals with a negative cost that bring in the used resource instead of spending it are
imaginable but could have implications on the chosen scoring and selection algorithm and
are omitted because of this.
Simultaneously to a lower end of the costs, there can be an upper limit on how much a
proposal can cost. The default for this is the budget size, although, with negative costs
proposals with a cost of greater than the budget are possible. This is omitted for the same
reason as above. An upper limit can be used to forbid a monopoly proposal that uses up all
the resources, or if the proposal is a candidate for a seat that obviously can not get more than
one seat.
A time can be set when no new proposals are allowed. This setting does not hinder discussion
itself, so it can still be discussed existing proposals and arguments. This is useful so that if
the voting has not started yet, the proposals can be evaluated and edited. And, which will be
the usual case, it should not be allowed to make new proposals while the vote is held.
4.3. Entering of Preferences
At some point, the participants are able to vote for their preferred positions and rank them.
Participants can change their vote as often as they please. This can be possible parallel to
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when new proposals can be made or can start at a specific time. Likewise, the ending of the
voting time does not have to be set. In this case, the results are shown directly and the votes
can be changed indefinitely.
To vote for proposals they use approval voting, known from section 3.2, to express which
proposals they want to see implemented. The participant has no possibility to explicitly
express a rejection as this would make the process more complicated. Furthermore, there is
no reason to vote a proposal down as long as there is enough of the budget left to implement
it. The majority will still win with their proposals. An unwanted proposal will be repressed
out of the budget if necessary.
Votes through approval have the advantage, that one can assume a safe default value for a
missing vote. Since a proposal can just be approved explicitly by a vote, there is no difference
between a rejected proposal and a proposal a participant did not even notice or that did not
exist at the time a participant made the last vote.
An original requirement was that proposals could be added after the vote has begun. This
must not lead to participants having to cast their vote again or even modifying their vote
without them knowing. Modifying proposals would lead to a more complex procedure, as
the votes of the participants would have to be invalidated and contacted to vote again. This
requirement was later made obsolete during the experiment but influenced some design de-
cisions.
When two or more proposals have been approved the participant has the possibility to rank
them by preference. By default, proposals are ranked in the order in which they are approved,
as this would be the natural behaviour the participant would expect. The distance between
two approved proposals is always the same. For the sake of simplicity, the participants do
not have the possibility to express for example that two proposals are of the same worth for
them. Enabling this would have led the decision process to a utility-based one described in
subsection 3.4.2, which would have serious implications on the scoring algorithm.
While assessing the proposals the participant has the possibility of getting a quick look at
arguments for or against. These were made by other participants from the discussion before.
Just arguments one layer deep into the argumentation graph are shown, as the other partici-
pants were asked explicitly if they agree or disagree with a proposal. This gives this layer the
most expression of pro and contra arguments. Moreover, a comprehensible presentation of a
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subgraph of the argumentation graph is a challenge on its own. Participants are encouraged
to jump right back into the argumentation with D-BAS again if wished for.
Contrary to earlier considerations no assumptions are made where the participant wants to
enter into the argumentation. Earlier in development, there was the consideration that if the
participant already approved a proposal she would probably not like to argue against it. This
idea was rejected to enable uniform behaviour behind the interface.
The pro and contra arguments are randomized and truncated to three of each category to
make the experience pleasant of discovering different aspects of a proposal by not too over-
whelming the participant with information that is not asked for. For participants who want
to see all arguments, the possibility exists to list them all, as the goal is not to withhold any
information that could influence the participant’s choice.
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Figure 4.1.: The voting interface. Participants could approve proposals from below. After-
wards these proposals could be ranked to express priority.
(This figure is translated from German).
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4.4. Determining the Winning Set
After the participants have voted for and prioritized their favoured proposals, the result of
winning proposals is determined. Even though the result is available in real-time, we decided
to hide the result until the voting phase was done. We did this because we suspected that
seeing the current result would animate participants to change their vote and check again on
what had changed in the result. This would not be the desired behaviour as the votes of others
would actually influence the own vote.
For the result to be calculated the set of all preferences from the participants are gathered
and scored with a mix of the approval and the Borda score explained in Chapter 3. The
maximum number N as the highest score for Borda count is selected as the highest number
of preferences a participant has chosen. With this, the Borda score for the preferences of each
user is determined. As before, the first preference gets the maximum score of N, the second
a score of N−1, etc. All proposals that were not preferred by the participant are getting the
implicit, minimum score of 0. The scores of every participant are summed up, just like with
plain Borda score.
The behaviour of an implicit score for every proposal is needed because it could not be known
beforehand how many proposals will be made. It could well be so much of a burden to assess
all the proposals that a participant has no interest in ranking them all, leading to the ranking
of none of them.
There would be other possible values for this truncated preference list, like the average of the
scores the proposals would have received if they were appended to the end of the list. This
thought was abandoned to give a clear contrast between preferred and not preferred.
As a tiebreaker for this Borda score, the approval score —1 if preferred, 0 if not— was used,
the ultimate tiebreaker is just the order in which the proposals were made. There was the
thought to use the cost of a proposal as a tiebreaker because a proposal with fewer costs
would allow for more winners in the end. This seemed too much of an intervention into the
vote to appear fair.
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4.5. Example
A version of this example was given to the participants as a way to explain how the decision
is made.
Suppose we have three participants Christian, Alexander and Markus. We want to decide on
three possible proposals. C 10,000 are available as the budget. The proposals could be: A
hackathon with an estimated cost of C 4,000, a water cooler in the entrance area for C 2,000
and the modernization of a computer lab for C 7,000.
The participants are casting their preferences as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1.: Preferences of the three participants
1st priority (3 P) 2nd priority (2 P) 3rd priority (1 P) rejected (0 P)
Christian Water cooler Hackathon - Computer lab
Alexander Computer lab Hackathon Water cooler -
Markus Hackathon Computer lab - Water cooler
After the vote, their preferences get scored. All their first preferences get the same points
(P), the second ones get the same with one less than the firsts, etc. Alexander has submitted
the most preferences with three and because of that, the score for all first preferences will be
three points. (Subsequently, all second preferences will get two points.) Rejected preferences
get no points in any case.
The sum of the points for the proposals are shown in Table 4.2:
Table 4.2.: Aggregation of Preferences
Points Costs
Hackathon 7 C 4,000
Computer lab 5 C 7,000
Water cooler 4 C 2,000
As the budget is just C 10,000 not all proposals can win at the same time. Because the
hackathon has the most points of them all, this proposal is included in the winning set, leaving
C 6,000 for the remaining two proposals.
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The proposal for the modernization of a computer lab will cost C 7,000. This is too much for
the remaining budget. The proposal can not fit in the budget without displacing the winner
and so it will not be included in the winning set.
The water cooler has a cost of just C 2,000 that will fit in the C 6,000 of the remaining budget.
Because of this, the proposal will be a winner, too, leaving C 4,000 of unspent budget.
Proposals that nobody voted for —which therefore got zero points— will never win, which
is an unlikely but possible event. The expectation is, that the one making the proposal will
also agree on it.
Draw in Points
Assume that a fourth participant, Martin, takes part. With Martins preferences the tables
were updated. (See Table 4.3 and Table 4.4)
Table 4.3.: Updated preferences of the four participants
1st priority (3 P) 2nd priority (2 P) 3rd priority (1 P) rejected (0 P)
Christian Water cooler Hackathon - Computer lab
Alexander Computer lab Hackathon Water cooler -
Markus Hackathon Computer lab - Water cooler
Martin Computer lab Water cooler Hackathon -
Table 4.4.: Updated aggregation of preferences
Points Costs Approvals
Computer lab 8 C 7,000 3
Hackathon 8 C 4,000 4
Water cooler 6 C 2,000 3
Now the situation has changed. Because Martin prefers the computer lab and has sorted
the hackathon to the third place, the points gained by both are equal. The situation is re-
solved by taking into account the number of participants, who actually voted for a proposal.
Independent on how they have sorted their preference.
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Christian did not vote for the computer lab, while everyone approves to the hackathon. Be-
cause of that the computer lab just gets an approval score of three and the hackathon a score
of four. The hackathon wins again, if only in the second instance. The rest of the scenario
plays out the same as in the example of three participants.
4.6. Problems with the Estimation of Costs
A problem for participants is that they can not reliably estimate the cost of a proposal.
Projects in public space are often a lot more expensive than they are if they were done by
a private person. This is because of labour costs, the need for certified equipment and several
other influences that do not apply to private persons.
Often proposals can occur, that does not have a specific cost point. The participant would like
to have a specific amount of funds for a proposal but would do fine if it would get less. This
observation leads to a conflict for the participant. On the one hand, the participant would
like to have the most amount of funds possible and would estimate the costs for the proposal
as high as needed. This would result in a lower chance of getting in the winning set if the
proposal does not get the highest score in the vote. On the other hand, the participant is
therefore encouraged to make a cheaper estimate in order to receive any funds at all.
Coming back to the example in Section 4.5, Alexander estimated a cost of C 7,000 for the
modernization of the computer lab. A budget of C 4,000 was left of the budget. It did not
match the estimated cost, but it would be imaginable that a computer lab could be improved
with C 4,000 as well. Should Alexander have made a smaller estimate? If the proposal with
the water cooler had not been made, then there would be C 6,000 left. This would have left
Alexander with less than he had hoped for.
This leads to the thought that participants could make proposals with more confidence if in-
stead of a fixed price point they could make proposals with a range of cost. While this would
be better for the participant making the proposal, it would be hard to let all participants vote
on a proposal with a possible wild range of cost. Because there can be no guaranteed cost,
this could seem deceptive. The following section explains, why correcting the cost without
evil intentions is still not recommended and could lead to trust issues in the procedure.
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Corrections of Costs
The costs of a proposal have to be fixed, as later modifications of them could influence the
vote. The situation that someone had already voted for a proposal with certain costs and
then drastically changed would not have been fair and would have changed their vote. This
would be bad in either way and could lead to dissatisfaction. If for example, participants had
voted for a proposal with an estimated cost and the cost was drastically corrected upwards,
then the participants may have never voted for the proposal in the first place, as it may have
been too expensive for them. Subsequently, if the costs were corrected downward, it can
not be assumed, that all participants who voted for this proposal, want it implemented if the
implementation is going to be cheap. The participants could have quality concerns with a
cheaper implementation. It has been noted that cost corrections would have to be made, but
they can not take place if a participant could already vote.
4.7. Possible Effects of Personal Incentives on the
Discussion Climate
By now, D-BAS did not provide any outside incentive to show flag for a position, other than
the own conviction. Now, with the possibility of gain in the form of winning an election, be
it for the win itself (remember: in D-BAS, winning an argument does not exist) or a real-life
personal benefit by getting funding for a desired project. It can be assumed that participants
argue differently if nothing is at stake for them.
It can be expected that arguments are made to weaken an opponents position, as attacking
another argument could lead to more available funds for the own proposal. One could even
agree with a position but decides to argue against it, because the position is indeed favourable,
but may not be as favourable as another position. This form of argument was indeed added
during the experiment.
By now there is no way to include positions into an argumentation other than as a conclusion
to an argument, because of this D-BAS does not have any way to represent this behaviour of
users.
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4.8. Voting Security
In most kinds of votes, there are some security and privacy considerations to be made. These
considerations have to be done to protect the participants and the process itself.
As the voting is conducted as a secret vote, no other participant is allowed to see what another
participant has voted for, and it could even be argued that it can not be allowed to know if a
specific participant has participated in the process or not. The latter may be leaked, because
decide uses D-BAS as its authentication backend. D-BAS creates a user account for everyone
who logged in at least once and these user accounts are publicly visible and most of the users
who voted did not have an account in D-BAS before. Although the existence of an account
is not proof that a user has voted, this is a strong indication. As the participation in services
from D-BAS was not high while the vote was ongoing no new users other then from the
vote were added. This is a flaw that has to be taken into consideration in possible future
processes.
As the participants were informed and had to agree that their submissions may be used anony-
mously for scientific purposes, these requirements had to be loosened for obvious reasons. At
least the person in charge of the procedure will have to have access to the votes, be it anony-
mously, to determine how many have participated in the voting process without attending the
argumentation actively.
Authorization and Authentication
Unlike in other participatory processes, it was possible to ensure, that every participant can
just vote once because participants have to log in through the identity management system
(IDM) of the university. In environments where there are not such IDMs this can be a serious
challenge.
Outside of an institution like a university, other forms of authentication would have to be
used. Registration and login through a common e-mail based system could lead to fake
accounts generated by harmful participants. This is something that has to be avoided, but it
could lead to other problems, especially for emerging processes.
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E-mail authorization is known by almost all users of the internet and is, therefore, a low
barrier to participate in a process. Other means of authorization and authentication, like
a state identification card number, such as the German eID card1, can be a bigger barrier.
This could result in lesser participation overall, threatening the existence of participatory
budgeting, and e-participation processes as a whole.
Which forms of authorization and authentication could be used has to be decided on a per-
process basis. For example, it could be possible to invite citizens of a neighbourhood to
a participation process where a letter with a security code is sufficient, as the impact on a
decision is contained and may not be as critical as a political vote.
Better security measurements have to be implemented if one considers deciding in a proce-
dure where the stakes and therefore the incentive for manipulation is higher.
4.9. Implementation Details
The software developed for this experiment —decide2, to fit with the other D-BAS extension
discuss3— is meant as a piggy back extension to D-BAS. The workings of D-BAS are
not modified radically that would restrict other discussions. Only the possibility to add an
estimated price point to a proposal was added, but just for discussions that required this
feature. This allows running several discussions next to each other in a single instance. Even
parallel decision processes are possible.
The changes on D-BAS allow to set all timings in the database itself, allowing for automated
switching between phases. Since the timings are optional, it can be customized how different
phases in a procedure play out. For example in the experiment for this work, there was
the spontaneous need to disable the addition of further proposals while existing proposals
were reviewed. It would also be possible, though, that results are always visible and the
voting phase never ends. This could be useful when proposals were made continuously by
participants while winning proposals were processed at the other end by the administration
and afterwards removed from the system4.
1https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/ElectrIDDocuments/German-eID/german-eID_node.html
2https://github.com/hhucn/decidotron
3https://github.com/hhucn/discuss
4Refer to the process in Reykjavík in Section 6.3
29
Chapter 4. Decision Making with D-BAS
Authorization and authentication were also coupled to the D-BAS main system and was not
handled separately, allowing for the matching between how the participants participated in
the argumentation and how was voted. (See Section 5.7)
Decide is open source and under the MIT licence. It can be found on https://github.
com/hhucn/decidotron. D-BAS can be found under https://github.com/hhucn/
dbas and was initially developed by Tobias Krauthoff as part of his doctoral thesis [Kra18].
D-BAS is now under ongoing development and maintenance by the chair for computer net-
works and communication systems at the Heinrich-Heine-University.
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Experiment
To try out how participants make use of D-BAS and decide, an experiment was conducted
with students of the computer science course at the Heinrich-Heine-University.
This implied that a fully controlled and observed scientific environment could not be created
for the experiment, as the procedure was a true process of real money distribution. The
participants were told that the process was scientifically accompanied and their submissions
will be used anonymously for this and future scientific works.
If the aftermath of this experiment is satisfying for each party, there is the thought of using the
same procedure in other courses. This would have the desired side effect that the procedures
can be compared and evaluated next to each other.
The raw anonymous data (in German) can be found in the Appendix. The argumenta-
tion can be found online on https://dbas.cs.uni-duesseldorf.de/discuss/
verteilung-von-qualitatsverbesserungsmitteln. The decision system (now
only showing the results) can be found here: https://decide.dbas.cs.uni-duesseldorf.
de/preferences/verteilung-von-qualitatsverbesserungsmitteln. Both
systems are subject to change.
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5.1. Setup
For the setup of the experiment, the scientific institution (wissenschaftliche Einrichtung
/ WE) of computer science provided C 20,000 of so called Qualitätsverbesserungsmittel
(QVM) (quality enhancement funds). These funds can be requested for the improvement
of teaching in the course of computer science. Because the funds were not used to the full
extent in recent years, this money piled up, with no idea on how to spend it. It is assumed
that most of the students do not even know about these funds or its purpose, so the decision
was made to use the money for proposals the students provided, giving them the control and
maybe advertising that such things are possible.
For this, certain restrictions had to be made:
1. Only properly enrolled students of computer science may bring in proposals and vote.
2. A proposal may not cost more than C 20,000, for obvious reasons.
3. A proposal may not cost less than C 100, as with a minuscule estimate the administra-
tive cost would outnumber the cost of the proposal itself. The value was estimated and
there was no restriction by the scientific institution.
4. A proposal has to be made in the scope of the QVM, that means it has to make an
improvement to the teaching and it must be able to be implemented by computer sci-
ence department without entering into the area of responsibility of other departments.
To be explicit, no proposals for changes to the infrastructure of the university can be
accepted.
These rules were published on the launch page and were accessible through a prominent
button in the interface where new proposals could be made. Examples of proposals that can
not be implemented as they do not follow Rule 4 were visible there.
Rule 1 was enforced through the LDAP directory of the university, which is publicly accessi-
ble for every student and employee. Participants could just login with their id and password
that they use for other services in the university. The LDAP directory allows a filter to just
accept students who enrolled in computer science. While the trust in the correctness of this
directory was not absolute, the directory was the single best way to authenticate students.
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The process started on the 23. April 2019 and was initially planned to last for two weeks.
Divided up in two phases, each one week in duration, the first phase would be focused on the
submission and argumentation of proposals. The second phase would just open the voting
system. This was done, so that participants will not just take part at the beginning of the
procedure, when this time just a few proposals would already be made, and vote on them,
missing the later proposals.
Shortly after the start of the procedure, the discovery was made, that a third phase has to be
introduced, stretching the experiment to nearly three weeks. All students were invited to the
process by e-mail over a common e-mail distribution list. There was no specific target group,
as this would be against the spirit of the QVM.
5.2. Phase 1 — Proposals and Argumentation
For the experiment, the live, public version of D-BAS was used, like in the field experiment
conducted in 2017 [KMM17], where everyone from the computer science department was
asked to argue about how to improve the course of computer science. As expected the most
participation was on the day of the notification, with a degrading amount of participation the
following days.
All in all 52 registered students participated in the argumentation. Eleven of these had used
D-BAS before —not necessarily in the first field experiment— and 36 registered for the first
phase. The remaining five participants joined the argumentation later in the process in phase
3. Contrary to the first field experiment there was no data collected about participants that
did not login, refer to Section 5.7 for detailed information.
Figure 5.2 shows the share each user has in the total number of arguments. Even more than in
the first field experiment with D-BAS the argumentation was driven by a few participants. In
the case of the user with the highest share, the arguments were mostly not added throughout
the course of the argumentation but in a relatively short time. This is the cause for the steep
growth of the graph in Fig. 5.1 at the 01.05.2019 12:00 mark.
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Figure 5.1.: This is the timeline of the procedure. The participation process started on the
23rd of April 2019 at 12:36 and ended on the 13th of May 2019 at 12:00. Each
vertical line represents the moment an e-mail was sent to the participants to in-
form them about the ongoing procedure. The number of arguments is measured
once every hour and marked by a cross.
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49, 25%
29, 15%
19, 10%
8, 4%8, 4%
7, 4%
6, 3%
5, 3%
5, 3%
5, 3%
56, ≤ 2% each
Figure 5.2.: Proportion of participants of the total number of arguments. The full circle rep-
resents 197 arguments.
The Need to have a Review of the First Phase
After the first day, it was found that participants did not read or straight ignored the rules the
proposals had to adhere to. Several proposals were made that were against Rule 4 and even
mentioned in the examples.
Furthermore, it was found that participants did not stick with D-BAS’s format of statements
and that they made richer statements contradictory to the idea of indivisible statements in
D-BAS. This suggests that either the interface of D-BAS is not clear enough on how to use
the tool, or that there is the need to carry out one’s proposal further. The interface does not
allow for further information, or differently, is not designed for this.
Both of the mentioned issues forced the addition of an unplanned third phase after this phase,
in that these proposals were filtered according to Rule 4 and clarified, so that in the last phase,
the voting phase, each proposal would be unmistakable.
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Figure 5.3.: The final argumentation graph, after the filtering of phase 2. The grey point is the
issue, blue points are proposals (positions), yellow points are statements. Green
and red arrows represent arguments pro or contra the argument, they are pointing
at.
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5.3. Phase 2 — Correction of Proposals
Initially, the plan for the experiment was that there are just two phases. There should not
be any influences other than editorial changes. The second phase would consist of further
argumentation. This was abandoned, as it became clear that most of the proposals were
made in a way that would make them impossible to be included in the vote.
Reasons for this were:
1. Proposals did not comply with the rules.
2. Proposals were underspecified. No clear intent was visible.
3. Proposals were specializations of another proposal.
Several proposals were clearly not implementable and were strict against the published rules.
This has gone so far that proposals were made that were explicitly mentioned in the rules,
as not implementable. For example, it was mentioned that the computer science depart-
ment could not improve the insufficient Wi-Fi coverage, as this is within the discretion of
the Center for Information and Media Technology (ZIM). Nevertheless, this was one of the
first proposals, arguing that with the amount of money it should be possible to override that
limit.
Another reason was that proposals were made broadly, meaning they were ambiguous, with
an unknown scope of action needed. The intention of the author was not clear for the other
participants as well as for the person who later has to implement them. Example of this
would be the proposal to use the funds to generate more funds. The proposal did not mention
on how exactly this was imagined, whether it was intended to use the money to arrange a fair
to attract donating companies or for advertising of the course. An additional minor example
would be, that a participant proposed to provide a seminar room with power strips, this had
to be specified to say that the power strips had to be certified for e.g. fire resistance and that
they can not be permanently in the room, but can only be borrowed. The proposals that were
not clear in their intent were suspected to harm the later voting process. They could lead
to a misunderstanding with the participants and could have led to a later dissatisfaction if
the proposals won the voting process, but were implemented in a radically different way as
someone had imagined.
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A third week was added to the whole process to reflect the proposals and make editorial
changes, for that the possibility to add proposals after the first phase had to be disabled. It
was expected that there will be some proposals which can not be implemented, but after
the first day of the process, it became visible that this problem was bigger than originally
expected. Like mentioned in Section 4.3, before the start of the experiment the plan was
that proposals could be made in the voting phase as well, which dictated a lot of the design
decisions for the system.
5.4. Phase 3 — Voting
The last phase began with eight out of 21 possible proposals, on which the participants could
vote on. The proposals had editorial changes, which do not alter the original intention. In one
case three proposals were merged into a single one. To ensure transparency, a notification was
sent out to inform the participants on why some proposals had to be removed or changed.
Because of the delays introduced by the extra phase, this phase was shortened from the
planned week to five days, ending on a Monday. Even though nearly three times the number
of active participants took part in this last phase (142 voters), the interest in discussing the
existing proposals was low, as seen in Fig. 5.1. Just ten arguments were added to D-BAS in
this last week, contrary to expectations that further proposals will be made and discussed at
this stage.
It should be noted that from the 52 participants in the argumentation 18 of them did not
cast a vote. Five of them were authors of proposals themselves, with four of their proposals
rejected. As seen in Fig. 5.4 this is a noticeable amount of missing votes. This is contrary to
expectations, as an interest in the argumentation process would indicate interest in the whole
process where the final vote would mark the most important and only way to influence the
made decision directly.
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ArguedVoted
Proposed
Figure 5.4.: Proportion of participants in all levels of participation. Proposed has to be a
subset of Argued.
Voted: 142, Argued: 52, Proposed: 19,
Argued & Voted: 39, Proposed & Voted: 14
5.5. Results
The results were published twenty days after the start of the experiment. They were avail-
able exactly at the end of the experiment, as the calculation could be done in real-time, as
mentioned in Section 4.4.
A total of 142 participants entered their preferences, outweighing the numbers of participants
in the discussion immensely. Whether this is a result of missing information about partici-
pants who were not logged into D-BAS or if the burden of arguing is just higher than casting
a vote cannot be answered.
Notable is that there was nowhere near as much participation in the discussion itself, like at
the beginning of the procedure as can be seen in Fig. 5.1. This may be the result that the
discussion itself stagnated or that there is not an immediately perceivable reason in further
argumentation.
Of the remaining eight proposals, five were elected to be a winner. All in all C 18,650 of the
available C 20,000 will be utilized. Of the three proposals that were not voted, there were
two proposals costing C 20,000. The expectation was indeed that either one of the proposals
with a cost of C 20,000 will win or (nearly) everything else. One proposal (821; ‘Certification
courses such as LPIC, MCSA or CCNA should be offered.’) got the second most points, but
was too expensive with C 20,000. As the first proposal (790; ‘More programming language
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Priority Distribution
ID Costs 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th Borda Approval Single Top 3
790 1000,00 € 40 39 16 6 1 1 2 0 730 105 40 95
821 20000,00 € 17 26 18 5 3 3 1 1 475 74 17 61
823 12000,00 € 25 18 12 5 4 1 3 1 449 69 25 55
774 150,00 € 14 12 12 15 4 2 1 1 368 61 14 38
746 4000,00 € 12 10 11 14 7 0 0 1 331 55 12 33
748 20000,00 € 25 9 6 2 1 1 2 1 321 47 25 40
755 1500,00 € 5 3 12 9 6 2 0 2 210 39 5 20
851 2000,00 € 4 7 7 6 6 2 1 2 187 35 4 18
142 124 94 62 32 12 10 9
Table 5.1.: Distribution of proposals (ID) that were chosen with a specific priority. Accom-
panied by the used Borda and approval scores, as well as simulated scores for a
vote with just a single vote and a Top 3 priority vote. Sorted first by Borda score.
The tainted proposals lost in the process.
courses should be offered.’) just costs C 1000 it could be argued that with just a small
reduction of 821s cost, the result could be completely different.
The results in Table5.1 show, that the outcome of the vote would be the same if just the
approval score would be used to rank the proposals. This shows that in the participants in the
voting process are mostly aligned in their desires. A different result for ranking by Borda or
approval score would mean that either, (1) there is a small group of voters who just voted for
a proposal that the majority does not approve or that (2) there is a proposal that is approved
by a majority but only as a lesser preference, while the top preferences are varied a lot. (1)
would result in a high Borda score but in a low approval score. (2) would lead to a low borda
score, with a high approval score.
Results of other Scoring Methods
Although just Borda and approval scores are used for the result, simulations of other scoring
methods were done to investigate if the result would be different. The scores can be found in
Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.5.
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Figure 5.5.: Score distribution of the proposals.
The two other scores chosen are:
Single-Vote that simulates the case where every participant can just vote for one proposal.
The proposal gets a score of 1. This system is included because of the frequency this
voting system gets used in day to day life.
Top 3 Approval is the truncation of the approval score to the top three proposals. It is not
unusual in voting procedures to enforce a restriction like this1.
Actually, an approval score of the Top 2 preferences would yield another result. As seen in
Table 5.1, proposal 755 gains a lot of approval score with its votes as the third preference.
Without this additional score, proposal 851 would have won.
Another usual restriction would be that participants could just approve to proposals in such a
way that the approved proposals could not break the budget. This has a hit on the expensive
proposals, as with a cost of C 20,000 they could just be included in the preferences as the
first proposal.
1Refer to the process in Wuppertal mentioned in Section 6.2
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Although the outcome does not change, the budget filling C 20,000 proposals are punished
severely. It has to be decided from procedure to procedure if this is desired. On the one
hand, the knowledge about the general interest in these proposals may be lost, as they are not
chosen any more. On the other hand, it can serve as an educational tool. The goal of this
would be to teach citizens about financial dilemmas resulting from a restricted budget. See
Fig. 5.6.
Priority Distribution
ID Costs 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Borda Approval Single Top 3
790 1000,00 € 40 27 7 3 1 336 78 40 74
821 20000,00 € 17 0 0 0 0 85 17 17 17
823 12000,00 € 25 16 7 7 3 227 58 25 48
774 150,00 € 14 11 18 8 3 187 54 14 43
746 4000,00 € 12 13 10 10 1 163 46 12 35
748 20000,00 € 25 0 0 0 0 125 25 25 25
755 1500,00 € 5 5 10 8 3 94 31 5 20
851 2000,00 € 4 7 6 5 5 81 27 4 17
142 79 58 41 16
Figure 5.6.: Priority distribution, if the participants were restricted by the budget
5.6. Feedback from the survey
With the announcement of the winners every computer science student was invited to a sur-
vey, here no difference was made, whether a student just argued, voted, did both or none of
it. This survey was done in cooperation with the Department for Social Sciences from the
Heinrich-Heine-University. A cropped list of results is shown in Fig. 5.7. A number of ques-
tions are left out, as they are not relevant for this work, but for the social science department.
The full results will be published in the near future.
All in all the procedure was received positively by the participants. The weakest results were
at the question D-BAS helped to give me a better understanding of the topic of discussion. As
seen in Fig. 5.7, more than a fourth of the survey participants answered towards not correct
at all since there is not a more specific result, this can mean that either for some participants
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D-BAS is too complicated or that the participants had trouble to keep track of the whole
topic. This is a problem not yet tackled in D-BAS.
The results for the question it was immediately clear to me how to give my priorities in decide
hints that improvements on the interface of decide are needed. It seems to polarize the par-
ticipants in the survey more than expected, and while a considerable amount of participants
saw it as practical, it has to be remembered that the procedure has to be inclusive and should
be unambiguously understandable by everyone.
Pleasant is the results for Most students can agree on the current result, No one is unreason-
ably disadvantaged by the decision and their like. They show that the procedure is consid-
ered fair and testify to the general satisfaction of the participants with the outcome, which is
clearly an objective when trying to enable participation.
The by far best results are for the last five questions (except for the question about insults in
the argumentation), all of them were positive to exceptional positive. This validates that the
done experiment was useful and shows that more participation possibilities are desired.
5.7. Collected Data
D-BAS collects which argument was made by whom. This data is available to the public to
everyone who participated in the process, as the default setting is that the real name of the
participant is shown, to generate an environment in which everyone gets the encouragement
to make a serious contribution to the process instead of hiding behind their anonymity. Nev-
ertheless, the participants had the choice to choose that their name was not publicly visible.
Since the amendments to the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), D-BAS
no longer collects data on unregistered users, because of this it is unknown how many people
visited the argumentation without logging in. A login was just required when adding argu-
ments to the argumentation or interact otherwise with D-BAS, like participating in editorial
changes to reported arguments.
Decide only records the votes of a participant and that a participant voted at all. The exact
data of how the participants voted is of interest in the validation and later evaluation of the
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Tabelle 1
Frage Question
Procedural Justice Ich konnte während des Verfahrens meine Ansichten und Einschätzungen äußern. During the procedure, I was able to express my views and assessments. 7 7 1 5 6 5 7 6 5 7 6 7 7 6 3 5 5 6 7 5 7 5 5 3 6 7 5 7 7 7 7 4 7 5 5 7 6
Procedural Justice Ich hatte Einfluss auf die Entscheidung,  die durch das Verfahren erzielt wurde. I had influence on the decision, made in this process 7 7 1 7 7 5 5 4 6 6 7 7 7 6 7 6 4 6 1 7 1 1 5 2 2 5 7 6 5 7 7 4 7 4 1 6 7 5
Procedural Justice Die Verfahrensregeln wurden konsequent angewandt. The procedural rules were applied consistently. 7 7 2 5 4 4 6 5 6 7 7 7 5 7 7 7 5 6 7 3 7 5 6 7 4 7 5 4 5 7 7
Procedural Justice Die Verfahrensregeln waren unparteiisch. The procedural rules were impartial. 1 7 3 6 5 5 6 7 7 3 7 7 7 6 4 6 7 1 6 5 7 6 7 7 1 7 5 4 5 5 7 6
Procedural Justice Ich fühlte mich über das Verfahren korrekt informiert. I felt informed about the procedure correctly. 7 7 1 4 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 5 7 7 4 7 7 7 5 7 3 6 7 6 1 7 2 6 7 5 5 7 7 6 4 7 5 1 5 7 5 6
Distributive Justice Das Ergebnis der Diskussion trifft auf eine breite Zustimmung bei den Studierenden der Informatik. The result of the discussion meets with a broad agreement among the students of computer science. 6 7 1 6 6 5 6 4 6 3 5 7 6 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 1 2 5 7 6 4 7 4 2 5
Distributive Justice Die meisten Studierenden können sich auf das jetzige Ergebnis einigen. Most students can agree on the current result. 7 7 3 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 5 6 6 7 7 5 6 6 5 4 7 6 4 2 4 4 5 7 4 7 3 2 2
Distributive Justice Die Entscheidung ist sachlich angemessen. The decision is objectively reasonable 6 7 1 5 6 6 4 5 6 6 6 6 5 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 4 6 6 5 2 6 7 5 7 7 6 4 6 4 1 5 7 6
Distributive Justice Ein angemessener Teil des Gelds wird für Maßnahmen eingesetzt,  die meinen Anliegen gerecht werden. A reasonable portion of the money will be spent on actions that meet my needs. 7 7 1 5 3 6 6 5 6 5 7 4 5 7 7 7 6 6 5 7 7 7 5 6 5 3 2 5 4 4 6 7 6 5 5 7 1 3 5 2 6 6
Distributive Justice Ich habe mehr Vorteile als Nachteile durch diese Entscheidung. I have more advantages than disadvantages of this decision. 7 7 1 6 7 6 5 6 7 7 4 5 7 7 7 7 6 7 6 7 3 7 6 4 5 4 5 7 7 7 7 4 7 3 7 2 5 5 6
Distributive Justice Die Entscheidung ist vernünftig. The decision is reasonable. 6 7 1 5 6 6 4 7 7 5 7 6 5 7 7 6 7 4 6 6 4 7 4 6 6 3 2 6 7 5 7 7 6 4 4 6 4 6 2 3 5 7
Distributive Justice Es wurde ein fairer Interessenausgleich zwischen verschiedenen Anliegen erzielt. A fair balance of interests between different concerns was achieved. 6 7 1 6 6 5 6 7 6 6 5 7 7 6 7 5 5 6 7 2 6 5 2 6 2 4 4 6 5 7 4 4 7 3 2 7
Distributive Justice Niemand wird durch die Entscheidung unangemessen benachteiligt. No one is unreasonable disadvantaged by the decision. 6 7 5 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 4 7 7 6 7 5 4 6 6 7 7 5 2 6 2 7 6 6 7 6 4 7 3 3 7
Zielerreichung Die allgemeinen Studienbedingungen werden sich durch die studentische Mitentscheidung verbessern. The general study conditions will be improved by the student co-decision. 7 7 1 5 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 5 7 6 7 6 4 7 3 7 6 5 2 6 6 7 1 7 2 6 4 4 6 6 7 7 5 4 5 7 4 6 7 2 6 5
Zielerreichung Die Lehre wird sich durch die studentische Mitentscheidung verbessern. The teaching will be improved by the student codecision. 7 7 1 6 7 7 6 7 6 6 3 6 5 7 5 6 5 5 7 5 7 5 2 5 5 6 5 2 5 4 5 4 6 7 7 5 4 7 7 4 6 5 3 6 5
Zielerreichung Die Betreuungsrelation zwischen Studierenden und Lehrenden wird sich durch die studentische Mitentscheidung verbessern. The relationship between students and teachers will improve as a result of student co-decision. 7 7 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 6 7 1 2 7 6 5 4 4 5 6 7 4 4 5 6 7 7 6 4 7 7 4 4 7 2 6 4
Deliberationsqualität Die geäußerten Meinungen in der Diskussion waren gut begründet. The opinions expressed in the discussion were well founded. 6 4 5 6 5 4 2 4 4 6 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 3 6 4 1 3 5 7 4 4 4 5 3 5 5
Deliberationsqualität Die Argumente in der Diskussion waren zielführend. The arguments in the discussion were expedient. 5 5 2 5 5 4 6 6 5 3 5 6 5 5 5 6 4 2 7 5 4 3 5 5 6 7 6 4 5 5 3 7 5
Deliberationsqualität In der Diskussion haben die TeilnehmerInnen sachlich argumentiert. The participants argued objectively in the discussion. 5 6 6 6 6 3 4 6 5 5 6 6 5 6 7 4 5 6 5 3 3 5 6 7 5 4 6 5 5 6
Deliberationsqualität Die TeilnehmerInnen sind sich respektvoll begegnet. The participants met each other respectfully. 7 7 7 6 6 4 5 5 6 5 3 6 7 7 7 5 5 3 6 5 5 5 6 7 7 5 4 7 5 7 6
Deliberationsqualität In der Diskussion gab es keine Beschimpfungen. In the discussion there were no insults. 7 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 3 6 7 7 7 7 6 4 7 4 6
Deliberationsqualität Abweichende Meinungen wurden von allen TeilnehmerInnen akzeptiert. Different opinions were accepted by all participants. 7 4 7 5 6 5 6 6 7 6 7 6 4 1 2 4 5 5 6 6 7 4 6 4 7
Deliberationsqualität Die TeilnehmerInnen haben mehr miteinander als übereinander geredet. The participants talked more with each other than about each other. 7 7 6 5 3 5 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 3 4 7 6 5 4 7 4 4
Deliberationsqualität TeilnehmerInnen haben sich aufeinander bezogen. Participants have referred to each other. 1 6 5 4 6 4 6 5 4 5 3 6 5 4 5 5 3 4 4 6 7 4 7 4 3 5
Deliberationsqualität Argumente anderer TeilnehmerInnen wurden in der eigenen Argumentation berücksichtigt. Arguments of other participants were taken into account in the own argumentation. 7 6 4 6 6 4 5 6 6 5 4 4 4 2 5 2 6 4 3 2 4 6 7 5 4 7 5 7 6
Deliberationsqualität Es wurde auf Argumente anderer TeilnehmerInnen geantwortet. It was responded to arguments of other participants. 4 4 5 7 6 5 6 3 6 6 6 4 5 5 2 7 5 3 3 6 7 6 4 7 5 4 6
Erfahrung mit D-BAS Die für die Diskussion und Abstimmung verwendeten Systeme D-BAS und decide sind gut für die Unterstützung von Entscheidungsprozessen geeignet. The D-BAS and decide systems used for discussion and voting are well-suited to support decision-making. 6 7 1 5 5 6 5 7 5 5 5 2 7 6 6 3 6 7 7 4 3 7 3 3 5 5 6 7 7 6 4 7 5 2 2 5 7 5
Erfahrung mit D-BAS D-BAS hat dazu beigetragen,  dass ich ein besseres Verständnis zur Diskussionsthematik bekommen habe. D-BAS helped to give me a better understanding of the topic of discussion. 6 7 1 3 5 6 6 7 5 5 6 1 7 5 6 1 6 5 7 5 4 1 5 2 1 3 3 4 4 6 5 2 7 5 1 2 4
Erfahrung mit D-BAS Mir war sofort klar,  wie ich meine Prioritäten bei decide angeben muss. It was immediately clear to me how to give my priorities in decide. 6 7 1 3 6 5 3 3 5 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 5 1 1 5 7 6 4 2 4 5 7 7 7 4 4 4 7 3 5 5
Decision 
Acceptance Ich akzeptiere die Entscheidung. I accept the decision. 7 7 5 5 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 5 7 7 2 5 6 5 7 7 7 7
Decision 
Acceptance Die Entscheidung stellt mich zufrieden. The decision makes me happy. 6 6 1 5 4 6 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 7 6 7 6 6 4 6 5 7 7 2 6 6 5 2 5 6 7 5 7 7 6 5 4 7 2 5 4 6 6 6 6 6
Decision 
Acceptance Ich bin mit der Entscheidung einverstanden. I agree with the decision. 7 7 2 5 4 6 5 7 6 5 7 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 6 6 2 2 5 7 7 5 7 7 7 5 7 7 2 4 6 6 7 6 7 6
Zukünftige Verfahren Die Verwendung der QV-Mittel sollte auch in Zukunft mittels einer Online-Diskussion in D-BAS sowie einer Abstimmung über decide entschieden werden. The use of the QV funds should also be decided in the future by means of an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on decide. 7 6 1 6 7 6 5 6 4 6 7 6 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 2 7 5 6 6 2 5 7 4 6 7 7 6 6 5 7 6 1 6 6 5 6 5 6
Zukünftige Verfahren Es sollten noch weitere Entscheidungen, die für Studierende relevant sind mittels einer Online-Diskussion in D-BAS sowie einer Abstimmung über decide getroffen werden. Other decisions that are relevant to students should be made through an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on decide. 7 6 1 4 7 6 5 7 4 6 7 6 5 6 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 5 7 2 7 5 6 6 3 5 7 7 7 6 7 6 6 5 7 6 1 6 6 5 6 5 6
Statistiken auf Daten
Frage N Avg. Min Lower Quartil Median Upper Quartil Max
During the procedure, I was able to express my views and assessments. 37 5,76 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
I had influence on the decision, made in this process 38 5,13 1 4,00 6,00 7,00 7
The procedural rules were applied consistently. 31 5,74 2 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
The procedural rules were impartial. 32 5,41 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
I felt informed about the procedure correctly. 43 5,53 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
The result of the discussion meets with a broad agreement among the students of computer science. 30 4,97 1 4,25 5,00 6,00 7
Most students can agree on the current result. 33 5,30 2 4,00 6,00 7,00 7
The decision is objectively reasonable 38 5,50 1 5,00 6,00 6,75 7
A reasonable portion of the money will be spent on actions that meet my needs. 42 5,21 1 5,00 5,50 6,75 7
I have more advantages than disadvantages of this decision. 39 5,72 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
The decision is reasonable. 42 5,38 1 4,00 6,00 7,00 7
A fair balance of interests between different concerns was achieved. 36 5,19 1 4,00 6,00 6,25 7
No one is unreasonable disadvantaged by the decision. 37 5,73 2 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
The general study conditions will be improved by the student co-decision. 47 5,45 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
The teaching will be improved by the student codecision. 45 5,36 1 5,00 5,00 7,00 7
The relationship between students and teachers will improve as a result of student co-decision. 40 5,23 1 4,00 6,00 6,25 7
The opinions expressed in the discussion were well founded. 31 4,42 1 4,00 5,00 5,00 7
The arguments in the discussion were expedient. 33 4,88 2 4,00 5,00 6,00 7
The participants argued objectively in the discussion. 30 5,23 3 5,00 5,00 6,00 7
The participants met each other respectfully. 31 5,68 3 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
In the discussion there were no insults. 29 6,41 3 6,00 7,00 7,00 7
Different opinions were accepted by all participants. 25 5,32 1 4,00 6,00 6,00 7
The participants talked more with each other than about each other. 22 5,14 3 4,00 5,00 6,00 7
Participants have referred to each other. 26 4,65 1 4,00 5,00 5,75 7
Arguments of other participants were taken into account in the own argumentation. 29 4,90 2 4,00 5,00 6,00 7
It was responded to arguments of other participants. 27 5,07 2 4,00 5,00 6,00 7
The D-BAS and decide systems used for discussion and voting are well-suited to support decision-making. 38 5,11 1 4,25 5,00 6,75 7
D-BAS helped to give me a better understanding of the topic of discussion. 37 4,30 1 3,00 5,00 6,00 7
It was immediately clear to me how to give my priorities in decide. 36 4,94 1 4,00 5,00 7,00 7
I accept the decision. 47 6,51 2 6,50 7,00 7,00 7
The decision makes me happy. 46 5,41 1 5,00 6,00 6,00 7
I agree with the decision. 46 5,87 2 5,00 6,50 7,00 7
The use of the QV funds should also be decided in the future by means of an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on 
decide.
47 5,68 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
Other decisions that are relevant to students should be made through an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on decide. 47 5,70 1 5,00 6,00 7,00 7
Hilfstabelle für Boxplot
Frage Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max
During the procedure, I was able to express my views and assessments. N(37) 1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
I had influence on the decision, made in this process N(38) 1 3,00 2,00 1,00 0,00
The procedural rules were applied consistently. N(31) 2 3,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
The procedural rules were imparGal. N(32) 1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
I felt informed about the procedure correctly. N(43) 1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
The result of the discussion meets with a broad agreement among the students of computer science. N(30) 1 3,25 0,75 1,00 1,00
Most students can agree on the current result. N(33) 2 2,00 2,00 1,00 0,00
The decision is objecGvely reasonable N(38) 1 4,00 1,00 0,75 0,25
A reasonable porGon of the money will be spent on acGons that meet my needs. N(42) 1 4,00 0,50 1,25 0,25
I have more advantages than disadvantages of this decision. N(39) 1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
The decision is reasonable. N(42) 1 3,00 2,00 1,00 0,00
A fair balance of interests between different concerns was achieved. N(36) 1 3,00 2,00 0,25 0,75
No one is unreasonable disadvantaged by the decision. N(37) 2 3,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
The general study condiGons will be improved by the student co-decision. N(47) 1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
The teaching will be improved by the student codecision. N(45) 1 4,00 0,00 2,00 0,00
The relaGonship between students and teachers will improve as a result of student co-decision. N(40) 1 3,00 2,00 0,25 0,75
The opinions expressed in the discussion were well founded. N(31) 1 3,00 1,00 0,00 2,00
The arguments in the discussion were expedient. N(33) 2 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
The parGcipants argued objecGvely in the discussion. N(30) 3 2,00 0,00 1,00 1,00
The parGcipants met each other respecOully. N(31) 3 2,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
In the discussion there were no insults. N(29) 3 3,00 1,00 0,00 0,00
Different opinions were accepted by all parGcipants. N(25) 1 3,00 2,00 0,00 1,00
The parGcipants talked more with each other than about each other. N(22) 3 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
ParGcipants have referred to each other. N(26) 1 3,00 1,00 0,75 1,25
Arguments of other parGcipants were taken into account in the own argumentaGon. N(29) 2 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
It was responded to arguments of other parGcipants. N(27) 2 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
The D-BAS and decide systems used for discussion and voGng are well-suited to support decision-making. N(38) 1 3,25 0,75 1,75 0,25
D-BAS helped to give me a beUer understanding of the topic of discussion. N(37) 1 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00
It was immediately clear to me how to give my prioriGes in decide. N(36) 1 3,00 1,00 2,00 0,00
I accept the decision. N(47) 2 4,50 0,50 0,00 0,00
The decision makes me happy. N(46) 1 4,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
I agree with the decision. N(46) 2 3,00 1,50 0,50 0,00
The use of the QV funds should also be decided in the future by means of an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on 
decide. N(47)
1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
Other decisions that are relevant to students should be made through an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on decide. 
N(47)
1 4,00 1,00 1,00 0,00
During the procedure, I was able to express my views and assessments. N(37)
I had influence on the decision, made in this process N(38)
The procedural rules were applied consistently. N(31)
The procedural rules were impartial. N(32)
I felt informed about the procedure correctly. N(43)
The result of the discussion meets with a broad agreement among the students of computer science. N(30)
Most students can agree on the current result. N(33)
The decision is objectively reasonable N(38)
A reasonable portion of the money will be spent on actions that meet my needs. N(42)
I have more advantages than disadvantages of this decision. N(39)
The decision is reasonable. N(42)
A fair balance of interests between different concerns was achieved. N(36)
No one is unreasonable disadvantaged by the decision. N(37)
The general study conditions will be improved by the student co-decision. N(47)
The teaching will be improved by the student codecision. N(45)
The relationship between students and teachers will improve as a result of student co-decision. N(40)
The opinions expressed in the discussion were well founded. N(31)
The arguments in the discussion were expedient. N(33)
The participants argued objectively in the discussion. N(30)
The participants met each other respectfully. N(31)
In the discussion there were no insults. N(29)
Different opinions were accepted by all participants. N(25)
The participants talked more with each other than about each other. N(22)
Participants have referred to each other. N(26)
Arguments of other participants were taken into account in the own argumentation. N(29)
It was responded to arguments of other participants. N(27)
The D-BAS and decide systems used for discussion and voting are well-suited to support decision-making. N(38)
D-BAS helped to give me a better understanding of the topic of discussion. N(37)
It was immediately clear to me how to give my priorities in decide. N(36)
I accept the decision. N(47)
The decision makes me happy. N(46)
I agree with the decision. N(46)
The use of the QV funds should also be decided in the future by means of an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on decide. N(47)
Other decisions that are relevant to students should be made through an online discussion in D-BAS and a vote on decide. N(47)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 5.7.: Questions and their results. 1 is equal to not correct at all and 7 is In any case,
correct. The boxes are showing the range of the median 50% of scores, while
the whiskers are showing the minimum and maximum scores. The thick bar in
the diagram denotes the median. The + is the average.
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aggregation algorithm itself and is, of course, kept anonymous. The votes in decide are au-
thorized by D-BAS as the backend. Because of this, it is possible to investigate if participants
who voted also participated in the argumentation itself.
5.8. Future Improvements to D-BAS and decide
Although the process was successful, there are a number of improvement points if the process
should be repeated in the future. These are features that were out of the scope of this work
or nice to have features. This would include tighter integration between decide and D-BAS.
By now the systems are on separate sites with different UIs, therefore the jumping between
the voting UI and the argumentation is kind of unintuitive.
No data on whether participants were more satisfied with the simpler overview of decide is
available. It is clear that the list of decide overview is more suited to get an overview of the
larger realm of arguments than to navigate each node in the argument graph via the means of a
dialog. It should be evaluated what kind of UI improvements in D-BAS —and subsequently,
decide— are fitting to improve understanding of the discussion.
A number of more complex improvements, that should be thought of that were hindering in
the experiment. They could greatly improve the experience and possibilities of the approach
in this work.
5.8.1. Loosen the Constrictions on Statements
In the experiment, it was found that most of the times participants do not stick to the given
grammatical structure of ‘I think proposal A is right because of . . . ’. This is of great concern,
as the correct grammatical form is needed to later build meaningful sentences, with which
the participant is confronted. Three common violations against the form imposed by D-BAS
were identified.
1. Simple grammatical violations.
Example: Buy a 3d printer.
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To fit into the form, this should be formulated like this: I think we should buy a 3d
printer
2. Two or more arguments done in a single argument.
Example: Because there are already computers [. . . ]. Most students use their own
devices anyway.
This would have to be split into an argument which is supported by the second argu-
ment.
3. Statements which cannot be modeled as an argument.
Example: We should set up coffee machines. Like they are in the building of business
administration.
The information, that there is an example for the argument does not fit into the argu-
ment graph, as the sentence is neither a support nor an attack against anything, just
plain information.
Violation 1 can be fixed by the moderation system provided by D-BAS, someone has to report
this. Violations like this indicate that the participant did not understand what the task was.
This could be due to a bad interface.
Violation 2 could origin in a too slow interaction flow through D-BAS. The participant may
not be aware that there are ways to structure arguments like that. It would be advantageous
if the participant directly has the option to create a subtree of arguments when entering the
argument.
The last Violation 3 could be tackled by allowing participants to enter free text. This must
be limited to the bare minimum, as+ it could undermine the whole purpose of structured
argumentation if used incorrectly, but has the potential to enable a better understanding in
other participants which have to deal with this argument.
All in all, it seems like D-BAS is misunderstood and subsequently misused by the participants
in some cases, because D-BAS is an unknown form of arguing, with constraints which may
overwhelm the perception of a new participant. Often there is no possibility to formulate a
complex argument with proves, references and so on, simply.
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5.8.2. Extending Proposals
In the experiment, there was a proposal made to buy a 3d printer for C 1,000. A short time
later, a participant realized that printing material is needed for the operation of a 3d printer
and so another proposal was made to buy printer material for C 1,337. This proposal makes
sense if the first proposal is accepted, but does not when the 3d printer was rejected. Because
of that the two proposals should be related, or to be more specific, the first proposal should
be enhanced with the idea of the second proposal. This could be implemented by allowing a
proposal to have extensions as well, which act like proposals themselves. In a case like this,
the participants later have to vote not just on the first proposal itself, but which extension they
want to see implemented alongside the original proposal.
The extension system could accommodate a variety of proposed changes. Extensions could
be proposals to build upon the initial idea, by extending it with funds, but also to tone down
the proposal. This could be the case, when a participant has the opinion that a proposal
is good, but may be too ambitious, so the participant adds a limitation to the proposal. A
proposal could be ‘We should buy a cheaper 3d printer. This would cost C 300 less.’ thus
reducing the costs of the proposal from C 1,000 to C 700 when this extension is voted for.
This raises the question on how to score the proposals to get the result of the vote. Each
combination of proposal and selectable extension could be combined to a single possible
winner with the restriction that just one of the combinations could win at a time. The partic-
ipant would have to be given the same prioritization option as in the choice for the proposal
itself. This could prove challenging from the user experience point of view, as the way of
expressing one’s preference cloud become too complex.
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Participatory Budgeting
Implementations
This chapter presents some forms of participatory budgeting. It has to be noted, that there are
various processes out there, and each of them is different. Most of the times, these procedures
are suited for their specific situation, as most of them are done with a political background or
other intervening forces.
This overview is limited to relevant examples, containing the beginnings of participatory bud-
geting, an example on how to combine offline and online participation and an fairly similar
and hugely successful procedure.
6.1. Porto Alegre (Brazil) since 1989
The first large scale implementation of participatory budgeting began in 1989 in Porto Alegre,
a city in southern Brazil with a population of more than 1 million1. This started due to the
lack of trust in the local government from the population [Wam00]. It began with less than
a thousand participants and grew to an estimated number of 40,000 in 1999 [BRMTK] and
continued to be an annual participation process, but stumbled in recent years due to political
changes in the city [ABKV18].
1census from the 1st of September 1991
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6.1.1. Process
The process in Porto Alegre starts at the beginning of each year, with the preparation of the
whole process. In the first half of the year, the government informs about the finances and
determines regions in which the city is divided up. Each of these regions is assigned a Quality
of Life Index, which is later used for resource distribution. On the other side, the participants
analyse this information and gather followers to form interest groups. The participation takes
place in offline meetings where the local population comes together. In these meetings, first
proposals from the region are presented and discussed, together with proposals which the
government plans to implement. At the end of this phase, a rough selection of possible
projects is made.
In the next phase, the government publishes estimates of cost for the proposals, that can be
implemented and were made in the previous phase. The proposals are discussed in more
detail and then votes are held for them. Each region votes by themselves for the priority of
projects they would like to have implemented. These votes take place in the regular meetings,
in which two representatives are chosen to represent the region in a Municipal Budget Council
which has the responsibility to decide which projects will be implemented.
6.1.2. Comparison
While this participatory process is strictly offline, this process is included in this work be-
cause the process is considered to be the origin of participatory budgeting, which has led to
various procedures in Brazil and worldwide.
Deliberation takes places between informal factions in their corresponding regions. This is
more advisable when conduction an offline participation process in a large geographic area
where the matters of decisions are local most of the time. Also, there is still not a direct
influence of the people, as they vote for a representative that makes the final decision. This
is a necessity when there is no (digital) infrastructure to enable a large group of people to
participate directly.
Notable is the distribution of financial resources. As the process is done in different regions
with a proportion of the whole budget, several processes are done in parallel. Through the
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Quality of Life Index, the budget is not distributed evenly. According to the needs of each
region, with poorer, less developed regions are getting a larger percentage of the budget while
wealthier, more developed ones getting less. This sounds like a great idea, but can be hard to
implement without an exact metric of need for participating areas.
6.2. Wuppertal 2017
In 2017 the city of Wuppertal, Germany conducted a participatory budget process with
around 3324 participants. The goal was to allocate a fixed budget of C 150,000. The process
was therefore not just a consulting process, in which a council decided about what has to be
deployed, but a somewhat more direct method of participation.
The process itself was done with the EMPATIA platform, which was developed by the
EMPATIA [KKOS17] project2. A project by a consortium of European information and
communication technology partners, one of which, Zebralog3, had the responsibility for the
process. The participation took place in multiple phases, wherein every phase the citizens
had a different way of participating.
There was a final report which describes and summarizes the whole process. [Rue18].
Phase 1 — Collection of ideas
In the first phase of the participation process, the citizens could submit new ideas how to
spend parts of the budget. The submissions were possible by a number of methods to allow a
broad spectrum of citizens to participate. These include an online form, e-mail, postal, phone
but were also possible in person at one of many street stands.
Along with the collection of ideas and afterwards participants had the possibility to rate and
comment on the ideas to aid the implementing organizations in reviewing the submissions.
For the last week, it was not possible to submit ideas anymore, but only voting was allowed.
Of the 267 submitted ideas, 109 (a rough Top100) were chosen by the administration to
2https://empatia-project.eu/
3https://www.zebralog.de
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advance to the next phase. The remaining 158 were filtered out because they did not fit with
the criteria of the process.
Phase 2 — Review by the citizens
The Top100 ideas were presented at an open event for the citizens, a week after the first
phase ended. In a workshop where participants and representatives of the municipality could
discuss the proposals together and decide which ones are going to be the finalists, on which
the votes are held upon. These final ideas were checked again by the administration and 32
were approved to be possible to be implemented. These were compiled into a Top30 list and
a further 16 proposals were excluded due to their cost and the missing ability of the city to
implement them.
Phase 3 — Voting
The voting on the Top30 proposals lasted three weeks. Participants had the chance to cast up
to five votes either online, in person in the town hall or at a special voting party held at the
beginning of the voting phase. It was not possible to vote for a single proposal multiple times
and the votes had equal weight. The votes were summed up and the top-ranked proposals
were added to the result set if their cost fitted into the budget. If they did not fit, they were
simply excluded from the winning set. An exception to this rule was that the administration
reconsidered the costs of the proposal which was going to lose with around C 13,000 of the
proposed C 20,000 missing. They concluded that the proposal could still be implemented
with the remaining C 7,000, even if that meant that the proposal had to be cut somewhat.
For the participants to cast their vote online, they would have to be verified to prevent elec-
toral fraud. This was realized through SMS and landline telephone verification. The results
of the vote were not shown while the vote was still in progress, even though the result was
calculated in real time like it is possible in our software. This was possible because it was a
direct decision, not a form of the consulting process. Out of 5,325 votes from 1,627 partici-
pants, 4,761 were conducted online.
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Running Process in 2019
In 2019 the city of Wuppertal started a new participatory budgeting process4 with a budget of
C 165,000. This fits as two years are the budget period of Wuppertal, so it indicates that there
was imminent interest in a continuation of this kind of decision making. The similar amount
of allocated budget could indicate that the interest of the municipality is not to outsource their
decisions to the people, but to show the participants that they can provide significant input to
local politics.
The process is no longer run by EMPATIA and Zebralog, but instead, the process was taken
over by wer|denkt|was5. Nonetheless, the new process is like the first one.
6.2.1. Comparison
This process is similar to the approach in this work, in that it enables a direct decision making
by the participants. In comparison to other cities in Germany, this is one of the first processes,
which allows the participant to make the final decision [Rue18], while the government can
just limit the available choices. Participatory budgeting processes were mostly done in a
consulting manner, obscuring how the final decision was made by leaving it to the usual way
of a ruling council. This way a participant does not have proof that her involvement was
significant to the outcome of the process.
Problematic in the light of the experiment done in this work is, that a stretched out procedure
with several phases requires most of the participants to stay active with the matter. A luxury
that can not be expected everywhere, particular when the processes are small an not well
marketed.
Differences
A difference to our process is, that we do not allow for so-called multi-channel participation,
where the process is not strictly available online, but allowed for parallel participation via
4https://talbeteiligung.de/topic/buergerbudget
5https://werdenktwas.de/
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different media, after which results are merged in a single online system. Although this is a
good way to establish initial interest, this could prove more expensive when the scale of this
kind of process grows.
1. Proposition phase
a) A Comment section like in Section 2.3 is used.
b) Proposals have an upper limit of costs.
c) Proposals can be done either online or offline in various forms, including in per-
son, by mail or by telephone.
2. Review Phase.
a) Review takes place more than once with different granularities. Starting with a
rough review from the municipality, over an assessment by the citizens and at
last a feasibility analysis. The last to reviews are done offline and together with
representatives of the organizer.
3. Voting Phase
a) Votes are limited to five elements.
b) There is no prioritization.
6.3. Open Active Voting (Iceland)
Open Active Voting is a tool developed by Citizens Foundation6 in Iceland. It is open source
and available under the GNU AGPL v3 license7. The tool aims to enable participants to
allocate a fixed budget for the neighbourhood to proposals with a known cost. It is used in
the annual participatory budgeting process [Cit11] in Reykjavík, Iceland, which started in
2011. The budget of every year is 450 million Icelandic króna (about 3.3 million C8)
6https://citizens.is
7https://github.com/CitizensFoundation/open-active-voting
8As of 24.04.2019: 1 króna is equal to C 0,0074
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The proposals are submitted by the participants before the voting process. During the elec-
tion in spring 2010, 40% of the population of Reykjavík visited the proposal page (at this
time, the electoral system was) [Bja14]. After a month of collecting ideas, the municipality
evaluates the ideas, whether they are feasible or not and estimates a cost for each one to be
implemented.
The ideas are bound to one of ten neighbourhoods in Reykjavík and each participant can
just cast his vote for one of them. Each neighbourhood has a different budget, based on the
population density. The neighbourhoods are not assigned through or checked against any
residents register.
Votes are cast by selecting the desired set of proposals that fit into the budget assigned to
the neighbourhood. Just proposals from a single neighbourhood can be chosen, although
participants are not prohibited to change their neighbourhood and voting differently. The last
vote counts. Each proposal that was voted for gets a weight of one. Additionally, a single
proposal can be marked as a favourite, doubling its weight. At the end of the voting process,
all weights are summed up. The winners are chosen separately for each neighbourhood and
are chosen in the same way as presented in this work, by gobbling up the top-rated proposals
and skipping them if they do not fit in the remaining budget.
The procedure does not have an end, instead, the council of Reykjavík promised to evaluate
the Top10 ideas each month, deciding whether the proposals are getting implemented. By
this means 64% of all proposals were accepted.
Security
Notable about this process is, that there are different verification systems in place for different
phases of the process. Proposals can be submitted with an unverified login by e-mail or even
a Facebook account, lowering the entry level for participation. This allows for a deeper
investment of the participants in the process, which will likely increase the chances that the
participant returns to the system again to vote.
The voting itself is secured by either a text message verification or the Icelandic government’s
electronic identity system IceKey9. According to official statistics the e-identity system is in
9https://www.island.is/en/icekey-e—certificate/about-icekey/
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use by approximate 270,864 private persons10, at an overall population of Iceland of around
340,097 as of 2019.
6.3.1. Comparison
The voting system itself has similarities to the approach in this work. It allows participants
to vote for as many proposals as they like, with the difference that the sum of the chosen
proposals cannot exceed the budget, an idea we rejected as we did not see any gains from
this limitation. It actually hides the interest of participants in the proposals that are excluded
because of their cost but teaches the voters about civic budget restrictions [Bja19].
The proposals in this procedure are supported by pro and contra arguments that can be de-
bated. The arguments can be voted up and down by the participants. These pro and contra
debates resemble the way D-BAS is used through the voting phase to display arguments and
allows further participation.
All in all this procedure has a lot of similarities to the one used in this work. The major
difference is, that the costs of proposals are not set by the participants, but rather by a rul-
ing authority that can estimate the costs precisely, eliminating the problems mentioned in
Section 4.6.
Differences
1. Proposition phase
a) A comment section like in Section 2.3 instead of an argument graph is used. This
section is separated in a pro and a contra list, which lessens the gap to the system
used in this work.
b) Costs for the proposals are not set by the participants. This is a critical difference
from this work.
10https://www.island.is/en/indentification-services/login-service-statistics/
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c) Proposals are specific to an area, but as the participants can choose which area
they feel they belong to and the budget cycle for this does not result in different
processes.
2. Proposals are reviewed.
a) Costs are added by the municipality.
3. Voting
a) Votes from a single voter cannot exceed the budget.
b) There is no end to the voting process. The budget gets updated every year and the
leftover proposals are recycled in the procedure.
c) There is no prioritization.
A demo system is in place to explore the interface and its possible functions: https://
ktest.betrireykjavik.is.
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Conclusion
In this work, it has been explored, if a decision process restricted by funds and costs and
supported by an argumentation system can be successful and if it will lead to acceptance
by the participants. As the experiment has shown, this is possible and the participants are
satisfied with the procedure and the results. It has been found that even with strict rules,
a decision-making process is not sufficiently resilient against inadequate proposals. The
addition of the reviewing phase resulted in a hard separation of the argumentation and the
voting process. This has cut the procedure practically in half, as the voting phase actually
became just a traditional vote.
This leads either to the path of a supervised procedure, or the approach of D-BAS to structure
data as it enters the system. In this case, the latter seems to be an inadvisable solution because,
unlike previous applications of D-BAS, the information for a proposal must be validated
against an external source. The supervision of a specialized group, like the municipality,
is advised in these kinds of decisions. Future procedures in the style of this experiment
are advised to provide means to easily access and modify the argumentation, like merging
arguments or removing proposals. Currently, there is no way for untrained users of D-BAS
to do such kind of modifications.
Future Work
In order to test the acceptance of the participants, the experiment should be repeated in such a
way that there are not so many winners. It can be argued, that the satisfaction in the outcome
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is high because most of the proposals were able to be included in the winning set of proposals
and there were no highly controversial proposals.
Moreover, the results of this work do not mean that an unmonitored decision-making process
in a large society is not possible. If the goal is to make a less significant decision that does not
dependent on resources that are outside the control of the deciding system, the argumentation
and voting could happen without supervision.
If it turns out, that participants have great trust in a deciding system, it could be explored,
how a decision can be made without a traditional vote, just by anticipating the behaviour of
the participant in the argumentation. A possible scenario would be, that in the way D-BAS
interacts in a dialog with the participant, the system could ask directly for opinions about
positions, which hold knowledge for a decision. Further advancement of this would appear
in the example of the scenario of the demo discussion in D-BAS, where a family discusses
whether they should get a cat or a dog, without any system to make a decision. An observing,
deciding agent could make a decision for the family, without the direct involvement of the
members in any kind of vote. This could happen just by analysing the argument’s relation
to the family members. However, this would require that participants actually participate
in some form in the discussion and it can be seen in the results of the experiment, that the
majority of participants did not actively participate in the argumentation process itself, but
rather just vote. This could just be the result of less hassle for the participant.
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ID Proposal Cost
790 mehr Programmiersprachekurse angeboten werden. C 1000
821 Zertifizierungskurse wie z.B. LPIC, MCSA oder CCNA angeboten werden sollen. C 20000
823 wir mit der Unterstützung des ZIMs einen Hackerspace inkl. 3D Drucker einrichten. C 12000
774 man für die Seminarräume ausleihbare Mehrfachsteckdosen anschaffen könnte. C 150
746 der Computerraum im EG neue Hardware, insbesondere Peripherie, braucht. C 4000
748 jeder Absolvent von ProPra 1+2 ein Zertifikat bekommen sollte (bspw. iSAQB). C 20000
755 ein Programmakkreditierungsseminar des studentischen Akkreditierungspools ausgerichtet wird. C 1500
851 das Abgabesystem (AUAS) eine Auto-Speichern Funktion braucht. C 2000
Table A.1.: The raw proposals and their costs in German. They were prefixed in the UI to a
full sentence.
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Table A.2.: Raw preferences of proposals from 1st to 8th preference. The row order is
random.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
821 790
790
774 790 755 746
790 748
821
790 748 823
748 790 821 823
823 790 746 755
748 823 774 790 821
823 851 790 774
790 823 774 746
748 821
851 790 746
790 746 823 774 755
774 823 755 790 821
823 790 821 774 755 851 748 746
821 790 755 748
790 821 823
790 746 823
790 821
774 790 746 755
790 823
748 821 790
823
790 774 823 821
823 851
748 821 823
746 851 748 821 774 823 790 755
746 851 790 755 748 774 821 823
746 790 821 774
821 748 790 755 851
823
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Table A.2 continued from previous page
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
851 755 746 790
851 823 821 746 774
755 823 774 851
790 774 755 746 851
748
790 851 746 823 774
746 821 755 790 823
774 821
790 755 851 746
746 821
748
823 790 755 746
748 821 790
790 774
790 823 821 746
790 746 755 774 821
748 823 746
821 748 790 755 746
821 790
821 823 748 774
823 746 790 774
790 821 755
774 790
774 790 821 851
746 823 851 774
748 790 774 746
790 746 774 821 755 851 823 748
823 774 755 790
755 790 823
821 790
774 821
748 790 823 774 746
746
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Table A.2 continued from previous page
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
790 821 748 755 746
823 790 774
748 790 821
823 851
774
774 790 755 821
790 746 821 774 755 748 823 851
755 774 851 746
790 821
790 748 746 755 823 821 774 851
821 790 774
790 823 851
790
823 790 774
746
823 746 821 774 851 755
790 821 746
748 790 821
821 790
790 823 774 746
823 790 774
823 790 821 748 774
748 821 790
790
748 823 851
748 821 746 823
821 748
755 746 774 823 851 790 748 821
790 823 774 746 755
748
755 790 823 774
821 774 755 851 790
746 774
62
Appendix A. Raw Data
Table A.2 continued from previous page
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
821
748
774 746 790 755 823 821 851
746 790 821
790 746
821 790
823 821 851
821
748 821 823 746 851 755 790 774
823 821 790 774 755
790 823
823 748 790
790 821 746 774 823
790 823 821 774 746
790 823 851
748 790 746
823 790 748 746
821 851
790 774 823 746
790 821 748
823 790
748
790 821
748 821 790
823 790 821 755
748 821 790
851 790 748 821 746 774 823 755
746 774 823 851
748 755 821 790 746
748 821 790
790 823
790 774
774 790
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Appendix A. Raw Data
Table A.2 continued from previous page
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
774 790
774 790 755 851 746
790
823 774 790 851
823 821
823 790 821
823 748 821
774 748 821
746 774 790 823 851 821
790
821 790
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